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As pointed out above, a concept of virtue has been present in Western culture since before the time of Christ. It has enjoyed several moments of popularity, but it has never really caught on as a foundational element of ethical theory. Perhaps one of the reasons why this is so is because no one has ever come up with a thorough and universal understanding of virtue.
Plato is usually credited with describing what later came to be known as the 'cardinal virtues',*designated as such from the Latin word cardo which means 'hinge'. The four virtues named here, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance, are said to 'turn around the whole of a virtuous life'. In Plato's philosophy, virtue is nearly synonymous with knowledge rather than moral habit. We might rephrase this idea by seeing the four as different 'categories' of virtue:
Prudence, which is an 'intellectual virtue', the wisdom that guides practical decision-making.
Justice governs human relationships and social interaction.
Fortitude refers to human commitment and inner strength.
Temperance is the means by which we regulate or 'moderate' our appetites and emotions.
Aristotle's notion of virtue at first appears to describe the 'good life' of a righteous person. Upon closer examination, however, we begin to realize that the philosopher is describing a very particular life-style, namely that of the free, educated, male citizen of an ancient Greek city. In a certain sense, Aristotle's notion of the virtuous person is somewhat elitist.
Still, Aristotle's theory of virtue was a sound one. Through encountering similar situations, such as opportunities to practice truth-telling or not, by repeatedly deciding to tell the truth one builds up a habit whereby one will experience a nearly spontaneous tendency to tell the truth.
Understanding the function of virtue in this way, though seemingly simple, can turn out to be vague if not downright confusing. For it is not hard to imagine circ*mstances in which truth-telling, plain and simple, can cause serious problems for oneself or others. Suggesting that this is the way that virtue functions is also indicative of a behavioral (act-centered), deontological approach to ethics. That approach also leads one to understand virtue as a form of 'self-discipline'. Rather than providing a dynamic starting point for the process of ethical decision-making, it turns it into a variation of normative ethics.
The classic notion of virtue
Although virtue was important in Aristotle's thinking, he provided us with only a short list of virtues. Depending upon which source or translation one uses, we can isolate about ten to fifteen things that seem to qualify as virtues. Perhaps the best known virtue to which students of the philosopher are exposed is courage or bravery. This is frequently used to illustrate the maxim that virtue lies somewhere in the middle of two extremes, in this case between foolhardiness and cowardice.
This explanation and the example provided are so classic that hardly anyone would think of questioning them. Yet, a critical examination of the model leads to the realization that it contains no indication of exactly what course of action might classify as being 'courageous'. Given a rather wide range of possible circ*mstances that might surround the concrete decision that the person has to make, what one easily calls an 'act of courage' might be anywhere on the spectrum between foolhardiness and cowardice. There is nothing in the model itself to help us locate the 'place' of courageous activity between the extremes.
Thomas Aquinas adopted Aristotle's approach to ethical living but added much more to the substance of virtue. On the one hand, he redefined the goal of ethical living from the notion of 'happiness' to that of beatitude which he understood as the eternal contemplation of God. He also distinguished what he understood as the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity (taken from St. Paul, 1 Cor. 13:13), from the moral virtues. Together, these form the basis of Aquinas' guidelines for moral living.
The second part of Aquinas' most mature work, the Summa Theologiae is dedicated to ethical living. The text consists of two parts, usually designated with the Roman numerals I-II and II-II. The first part outlines his ethical theory which is clearly teleological (Selling, 2008, 2010). After describing the structure of the human voluntary, moral action and the 'passions' (emotions) he turns his intention to those things that influence ethical decision-making. The first of these are the habits we have built up over time: virtues and vices. Only then does he consider the external principles of that decision-making, namely law and grace.
Because Aquinas understands the intention-to-the-end to be the most important element of the moral event, the second part of his text turns to the virtues which he writes about in great detail. After discussing the theological virtues (1–46)**he divides the cardinal virtues into the intellectual virtues (prudence and its parts, 47–56) and moral virtues (57–170). The specific moral virtues he names are found in three categories. Justice (57–80) is further subdivided into religion (81), piety (101), observance (102), obedience (104), gratitude (106), vengeance (108), truth (109), affability (114), liberality (117) and epikeia (120). Fortitude (123) is further subdivided into martyrdom (124), magnanimity (129), magnificence (134), patience (136) and perseverance (137). Temperance (141–3) is further subdivided into spiritual beauty (145), abstinence (146), sobriety (149), chastity (151), virginity (152), continence (155), clemency (156), meekness (157), modesty (160), humility (161) and studiousness (166).
Although Aquinas takes over the general notion of virtue from Aristotle, he does not characterize its function as being a mean between two extremes. The reason is because Aquinas believed that in the case of making moral judgements and decisions, reason presents the will with a single notion of the good to be pursued. This is one of the reasons why many consider him to be somewhat rationalistic in his approach.
In order for virtue to become a key element in ethical decision-making, it needed to be rethought. The impetus to do that came about in the middle of the last century, right around the time of the Second Vatican Council. What we need to consider next is a revised understanding of virtue.
*While doing a bit of research on Aquinas' treatise on the sacrament of Penance, I found a curious remark about the role of Penance in 'restoring' the virtues. It is found at ST, III, q. 89, a. 1, sed contra: 'We read (Luke 15:22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in 'the first robe,' which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the 'mantle of wisdom,' from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wisdom 8:7: 'She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.' Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.' This was the first time that I encountered a claim that the cardinal virtues were part of the Judeo-Christian heritage. Further, and more time consuming research, revealed that the Book of Wisdom, one of the 'deuterocanonical' books of the Bible recognized by the Catholic and Orthodox churches but not by mainstream Protestentism, was probably written in Egypt (Alexandrea, a center of great learning) during the first century BC. It is not at all unthinkable that the author incorporated part of his philosophical knowledge (the four cardinal virtues) into his explanation of the nature of wisdom. Obviously, more research is needed. But the data as I have encountered it leads me to think that it was Greek philosophy and not Jewish Wisdom that 'discovered' the four virtues.
**The numbers in parentheses indicate the 'question(s)' in the II-II.
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